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This Survey begins with a discussion of United States v. McDermott.1 In
McDermott, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals by allowing a federal tax lien priority over ajudgment creditor's pre-
viously recorded lien on after-acquired property.
The Survey continues with detailed examinations of selected 1993
opinions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals involving matters of fed-
eral tax law. In Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 the
court determined that a bank that purchases another bank may take amor-
tization deductions for the cost allocable to the core deposit intangibles of
the acquired bank. In Denbo v. United States3 and Muck v. United States,4 the
court explored the applicability of the 100% penalty rule to employers
who fail to pay over withholding taxes to the Internal Revenue Service. In
Litwin v. United States,5 the court explored the ability of a corporate share-
holder-employee to take bad debt deductions for loans made to the corpo-
ration that subsequently become worthless.
The Survey concludes with a summary of other federal taxation deci-
sions issued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the survey pe-
riod and a brief look into the annual host of tax protestor cases.
I. THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS-FEDERAL TAx LIEN PRIMES JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED LIEN AS TO AFTER-ACQuIRED
PROPERTY: UNmiTo STATEs v. MDERorIf
6
A. Background
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 grants a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to any person liable to pay any tax who neglects or
refuses to pay.7 The rule under the Code is that the general federal tax
* B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver, 1977; Masters in Taxation, University of
Denver, 1978; J.D., Stanford University, 1981; Lecturer in Law, University of Denver.
1. 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
2. 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. 983 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
7. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988). The lien secures the amount of the deficiency, plus any inter-
est, additional amount, addition to tax, assessable penalty, and costs. Id.
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lien arises at the time the assessment is made8 and continues until the
liability for the amount is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of
lapse of time.9
The priority afforded competing federal tax liens and state-created
liens is a matter of federal law.10 Secured creditors will generally have
priority over the federal tax lien if their state-created liens were fully per-
fected and choate before the federal tax lien arose.1 1 Judgment lien credi-
tors, however, are afforded special treatment under the Code. The Code
provides that the general federal tax lien is not valid against any judgment
lien creditor until the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") files a notice meet-
ing the requirements of the Code.
12
Judgment lien creditors are therefore among certain creditors who
may have priority over federal tax liens, if their liens are fully perfected
and choate prior to the filing of the federal government's Notice of Tax
Lien. "The doctnne of choateness is intended to protect the standing of
federal liens. 'Otherwise, a State could affect the standing of federal liens,
contrary to the established doctrine, simply by causing an inchoate lien to
attach at some arbitrary time .... 1 13 Whether or not a lien is choate is a
federal question.1 4 For a prior lien on all of a person's real or personal
property to take priority over a federal tax lien, the lien must be "per-
fected in the sense that there is nothing more to be done to have a choate
lien-when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and
the amount of the lien are established."1 5 The applicable Treasury Regu-
lation acknowledges the judicially created choateness doctrine in defining
the term 'Judgment lien creditor" for purposes of the Code, and likewise
states the aforementioned three-part test.
16
8. Assessments are little more than bookkeeping notations entered by the IRS on the
taxpayer's account indicating that the amount has been administratively determined to be
due and payable.
9. I.R.C. § 6322 (1988).
10. United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 384 U.S. 323,
328 (1966); Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1961). The
general federal tax lien " 'creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, feder-
ally defined, to rights created under state law.'" Avco Delta Corp. Canada Ltd. v. United
States, 459 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55
(1958)).
11. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1954).
12. I.RC. § 6323(a) (Supp. IV 1992). In Colorado, such notice is deemed to have been
provided by the IRS with respect to real property upon the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien with
the office of the clerk and recorder for the county in which the real property is located. As to
personal property owned by a corporation whose principal office is in Colorado the filing of
a Notice of Tax Lien must be made with the Colorado Secretary of State. In most other cases
liens against personal property must be filed in the office of the county clerk and recorder of
the county where the lienee resides. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 38-25-102 (Supp. 1993).
13. McAllen State Bank v. Saenz, 561 F. Supp. 636, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (quoting
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954)).
14. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49 (1950).
15. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954).
16. The definition states:
The term "judgment lien creditor" means a person who has obtained a valid judg-
ment, in a court of record and of competentjurisdiction, for the recovery of specifi-
cally designated property or for a certain sum of money. In the case of a judgment
for the recovery of a certain sum of money, ajudgment lien creditor is a person who
[Vol. 71:41064
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McDermott involved an interpleader action centering on the compet-
ing claims of ajudgment lien creditor and the IRS in certain real property
located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
17
B. Facts
On June 22, 1987, Zions First National Bank ("Zions") obtained a
judgment in the amount of $67,977.67 against the McDermotts and prop-
erly docketed the judgment in Salt Lake County on July 6, 1987.18 Under
Utah law, Zions's lien attached to all of the McDermotts' real property
located in the county. 19 The IRS obtained its lien by filing a Notice of Tax
Lien on September 9, 1987. As a result of such filing, the IRS's lien at-
tached to all of the McDermotts' owned and after-acquired real and per-
sonal property.
20
On September 23, 1987, the McDermotts took title to certain real
property in Salt Lake County for which they already had a purchaser.
2 1
To obtain title insurance for the property to complete the sale to this new
purchaser, the McDermotts were required to obtain releases from Zions
and the IRS.22 The parties entered into an escrow agreement by which
Zions and the IRS released their claims to the real property, while reserv-
ing their rights to the cash proceeds of the sale. The escrow agreement
provided that the priority of the competing claims of Zions and the IRS
would remain identical to the priorities they held in the Salt Lake County
has perfected a lien under the judgment on the property involved. A judgment lien is
not perfected until the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of
the lien are established Accordingly, ajudgment lien does not include an attachment
or garnishment lien until the lien has ripened into judgment, even though under
local law the lien of the judgment relates back to an earlier date. If recording or
docketing is necessary under local law before ajudgment becomes effective against
third parties acquiring liens on real property, ajudgment lien under such local law
is not perfected with respect to real property until the time of such recordation or
docketing. If under local law levy or seizure is necessary before a judgment lien
becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on personal property, then a
judgment lien under such local law is not perfected until levy or seizure of the
personal property involved.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-i (g) (1976) (emphasis added).
17. McDermott v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 945 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
18. Id. at 1477.
19. Utah law provides:
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed and
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a lien
upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the time or by him
thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien.
UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-22-1 (1992) (emphasis added).
20. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1477. The general federal tax lien applies to after-acquired
property, even though not specifically stated in I.R.C. § 6321. Glass City Bank v. United
States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945).
21. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1477. The McDermotts had sold this property to two individ-
uals in 1981, taking back a note and a deed of trust securing the note. The purchasers,
defaulted and, after some interim struggles and maneuvers, the McDermotts succeeded in
getting the trustee to notice a sale of the property at which the McDermotts repurchased the
property by submitting a credit bid and assuming an underlying mortgage. Id. at 1477-78.
22. Id. at 1477.
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property.23 The escrow agreement also required that the McDermotts in-
stitute an interpleader action so that a court could determine who was
entitled to priority in the proceeds of the sale.
2 4
In the interpleader action, the federal district court found that Zions
had priority according to the common law "first in time, first in right"
doctrine.2 5 Although both liens attached simultaneously on September
23, 1987, Zions had filed first. The district court also found that the IRS
waived its interest in the McDermotts' sales contract as personalty and the
proceeds of that personalty by virtue of the Escrow Agreement.2 6 The IRS
appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The issue before the Tenth Circuit 2 7 was whether Zions's non-contin-
gent lien on all of the McDermotts' real property, perfected prior to the
federal tax lien, took priority over the federal lien when the competing
lienors were claiming interests in after-acquired property. Because Zions's
identity as the lienor and the amount of its judgment lien were known, the
only question under the relevant three-part test was whether the "property
subject to the lien" was sufficiently established.
28
The IRS argued that because the choateness doctrine requires the
property subject to the lien to be established, ajudgment lien creditor can
only acquire a perfected or choate lien with respect to property owned by
the debtor at the time the judgment creditor obtains his lien, and not as to
after-acquired property. 29 The theory of the IRS was, therefore, after-ac-
quired property of the debtor would be subject to a superior federal tax
lien if that lien was perfected by filing subsequent to the time that the
judgment lien creditor obtained his lien, but prior to the time that the
debtor obtained ownership of the property to which the competing liens
attach. Under this view, Zions's judgment lien did not become choate
until September 23, 1987, when the McDermotts acquired title to the real
property in question, and therefore the IRS's lien, as perfected by its No-
tice of Tax Lien filed on September 9, 1987, would prime Zions's lien.
23. Id. The escrow agreement provided in relevant part:
The respective priorities of the parties to the cash proceeds shall be identical to the
priorities of the respective liens of the parties as they existed against the real prop-
erty as of September 23, 1987, after Bruce J. McDermott successfully bid and




25. The interpleader action was originally brought by the McDermotts in state court, but
the United States removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988). Mc-
Dermott, 945 F.2d at 1477 n.3.
26. Id at 1478.
27. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Tacha, Judge Seth, and Howard C. Brat-
ton, Senior District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico,
sitting by designation. Id at 1477.
28. See id at 1480.
29. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1480.
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The Tenth Circuit rejected the position of the IRS, holding that a
judgment lien creditor having a choate lien on all of a person's real prop-
erty will take priority over a later-perfected federal tax lien, even when the
IRS and the judgment creditor are claiming an interest in after-acquired
property.
3 0
In support of its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied primarily on United
States v. Vermont.5 1 In Vermont, the State of Vermont and the United States
held almost identical general tax liens, arising upon assessment, upon all
the taxpayer's real and personal property.3 2 Vermont's lien arose approxi-
mately three and one-half months prior to the federal tax lien, and related
to all of the taxpayer's property rather than specifically identified portions
of it. Subsequently, Vermont attempted to reach certain portions of that
property-a bank account-it had not yet taken steps to attach.3 3 The
United States argued that a state-created lien had to attach to specific prop-
erty in order for it to take priority; that is, the requirement that the prop-
erty subject to the lien is not "established" unless there is specific property
to which the lien attaches. 3 4 The Supreme Court held that, even though
both liens were general in nature, both were equally perfected as to all the
taxpayer's property and were choate at the time the liens arose. 35 There-
fore, when both governments attempted to satisfy their liens with the same
property, Vermont's lien took priority, being the lien that arose first.3 6
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Zions's lien was no less "perfected"
than Vermont's in United States v. Vermont
Zions' lien was not contingent, it was docketed, specific in
amount, and fully enforceable against any real property owned
by the McDermotts in Salt Lake County during the pendency of
the lien. We agree with the cases cited by Zions in interpreting
Vermont to apply to property acquired by the debtor after perfec-
tion of the lien as well as to property owned by the debtor at the
time the lien was perfected.
37
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "Congress has made clear in sec-
tion 6323(a) . . . that judgment lien creditors who perfect their liens
before the filing of a federal tax lien have priority,"3 8 even where the prop-
erty as to which the competing liens are asserted is after-acquired
property.
30. Id. at 1482.
31. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
32. Id. at 352.
33. Id. at 352-53.
34. Id. at 356-57.
35. Id. at 358-59.
36. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 359.
37. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1481. See Wisconsin v. Bar Coat Blacktop, Inc., 640 F. Supp.
407 (W.D. Wis. 1986); McAllen State Bank v. Saenz, 561 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1982);
United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also WILLIAM T. PLUMB, JR.,
FEDERAL TAx LIENS 134-35 (3d ed. 1972) (asserting that "[iun light of [the Vermont] standard,
the typical general judgment lien on 'all' the debtor's real property seems safe from later tax
liens, at least if the lien is perfected against other third parties acquiring liens") (citations
omitted).
38. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1481.
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D. The Supreme Court's Opinion
In a 6-3 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.3 9 The majority and dissent both recognized that the
matter presented a very close question.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reiterated the New Britain
three-part test by noting that "our cases deem a competing state lien to be
in existence for 'first in time' purposes only when it has been 'perfected'
in the sense that 'the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and
the amount of the lien are established.' "40 Justice Scalia equated "estab-
lished" with "perfected," asserting the question was "whether the Bank's
judgement lien was perfected in this sense before the United States filed
its tax lien on September 9, 1987. If so, that is the end of the matter; the
Bank's lien prevails."
4 1
Justice Scalia then addressed the court of appeals' application of the
Vermont holding to the case at issue. Distinguishing Vermont on its facts,
Justice Scalia pointed out that Vermont did not involve after-acquired prop-
erty. 42 The bank account in question had in fact been owned by the tax-
payer at the time the competing liens arose. In Vermont, the IRS had
simply argued, unsuccessfully, that a state lien is not perfected for these
purposes if it attaches to al of the taxpayer's property rather than to spe-
cifically identified portions of it. "We did not consider, and the facts as
recited did not implicate, the quite different argument made by the
United States in the present case: that a lien in after-acquired property is not
'perfected' as to property yet to be acquired."4 3
The issue in McDermott thus centered on the meaning of the term
"perfected" in this context; that is, whether Zions's lien had been "per-
fected" for these purposes with respect to the subject property, where the
property had not yet been acquired by the McDermotts at the time the
judgment lien arose but was subsequently acquired after the IRS had filed
its Notice of Lien.
Justice Scalia chose to interpret the term "perfected" by equating it
with "attachment," and concluded that Zions's judgment lien was not per-
fected for priority purposes until it actually attached to the subject prop-
erty.44 This was determined not to occur until September 23, 1987, when
the property was acquired by the McDermotts. "Since that occurred after
filing of the federal tax lien, the state lien was not first in time."
45
Justice Scalia concluded, on the other hand, there is no requirement
in the Internal Revenue Code that the priority of federal tax liens likewise
must be evaluated from the time of actual attachment.46 To the contrary,
39. United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
40. Id. at 1528 (quoting United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1528-29.
43. Id. at 1529 (emphasis added).
44. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529 (1993).




the statute states simply that the IRS's lien is not valid as against a judg-
ment lien creditor until notice of the federal lien is filed.4 7 Filing of the
notice, and not attachment, is all the statute requires when measuring the
priority of the federal tax lien. Therefore, "while we would hardly pro-
claim the statutory meaning we have discerned in this opinion to be
'clear,' it is evident enough for the purpose at hand. The federal tax lien
must be given priority."
48
Writing in dissent, Justice Thomas (joined by justice Stevens and Jus-
tice O'Connor) acknowledged that the issue was a close one, and that "our
precedents do not provide the clearest answer to the question of after-
acquired property."49 Justice Thomas, however, characterized the factual
distinction drawn by the majority between the present case and Vermont as
"wooden" 50 and the product of a "parsimonious reading"5 1 of Vermont.
The dissent contended that "the Government's 'specificity' claim rejected
in Vermont is analytically indistinguishable from the 'attachment' argument
the Court accepts today."52 Justice Thomas viewed the majority's require-
ment that a judgment lien must attach to property before it can be suffi-
ciently certain for priority purposes as a "rigid criteria"53 not supported by
prior decisions, and would have preferred to apply a "more flexible cho-
ateness principle" 54 so as to protect state-created judgment liens. The dis-
sent would have held, as did the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, that the
bank's lien had already acquired sufficient substance and had become so
perfected with respect to the after-acquired property as to defeat the later-
filed federal tax lien. According to the dissent, the result reached by the
majority subjects a choate judgment lien in after-acquired property to a
"secret lien" in favor of the federal government.55
E. Summary
Seven of the thirteen judges who weighed in on the McDermott case
would have agreed-as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had held-
that Zions'sjudgment lien trumped the IRS's later-filed tax lien, even as to
after-acquired property. The decision of the Supreme Court, however, es-
tablishes the priority of filed federal tax liens over state-created judgment
liens in after-acquired property. While the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien
will not operate to prime ajudgment lien otherwise previously established
against property in which the taxpayer already has an interest, such a filing
will prevail over the judgment lien with respect to property in which the
taxpayer subsequently acquires an interest.
47. I.RC. § 6323(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
48. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531.
49. Id. at 1534 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1532.
51. Id. at 1534.
52. Id. at 1532-33.
53. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531.
54. Id. at 1534.
55. Id. at 1534.
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1I. BANK ENTITLED TO AMORTIZATION DEDUCTIONS FOR COST OF CORE
DEPOSIT INTANGIBLES OF ACQUIRED BANKs: CoLop.4Do
NATIOA'AL BAARE&!, 1,Nc. V. COMzrSSIO ArEyi
6
A. Background
Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes taxpayers to
claim a deduction for depreciation representing "a reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence)" of property used in a trade or business or held for the
production of income. 57 Applicable Treasury Regulations extend this de-
duction to the amortization of intangibles, providing that "[i]f an intangi-
ble asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business ... for only a limited period, the length of which can be esti-
mated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the sub-
ject of a depreciation allowance."5 8 However, "[n]o deduction for
depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill."59
The issue of whether amortization deductions can be claimed with
respect to a particular intangible asset generally arises in the context of a
purchase by one taxpayer of the going-concern business of another tax-
payer. In determining whether a particular intangible asset arising from
such a purchase may be subject to amortization deductions, the courts
generally apply a two-part test. First, the asset must have an ascertainable
value independent of goodwill. 60 That is, the taxpayer must show that the
asset is not simply a component part of or otherwise inseparable from
goodwill. Second, the asset must have a limited useful life, "the duration
of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy." 6 1
Neither the courts nor the Internal Revenue Code have fashioned a
definitive definition of "goodwill." The term has been employed to refer
generally to "the expectancy of continued patronage, for whatever rea-
son,"62 or put differently, the expectation that "the old customers will re-
sort to the old place." 63 As a tax accounting matter, the consideration
given by the acquiring taxpayer in an asset purchase transaction is re-
quired to be allocated among various classes of the acquired assets under
the so-called "residual method," and goodwill is generally the last class of
assets to which consideration is allocable, after allocations are made to
certain tangible and intangible assets.
6 4
56. 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
57. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
59. Id.
60. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 562 (3d Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974)), reu'd and remanded on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
61. Id. (quoting Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1250).
62. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962).
63. Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting Nelson Weaver
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1962)).
64. See I.R.C. § 1060 (West Supp. 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d) (1988); see also
I.R.C. § 338(b)(5) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (as amended in 1986).
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The courts have not necessarily been consistent in determining when
intangible assets are to be treated as inseparable from goodwill. In Hous-
ton Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States,65 the Houston Chronicle Pub-
lishing Company bought the assets of the Houston Press for $4.5 million
when the latter went out of business. Among the assets acquired were
subscription lists the Chronicle intended to use to increase its own circula-
tion.66 Based upon its estimate that forty percent of the Press subscribers
would subscribe to the Chronicle, and that the average cost of obtaining a
new subscriber was $2.00, the Chronicle allocated $71,200 to subscription
lists. 67 The Chronicle then amortized them over a five year period. 68 The
IRS challenged the amortization deductions, asserting that the lists were
inseparable from goodwill and therefore inherently nondepreciable.
Finding the subscription lists to be intangible capital assets that could be
depreciated, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held for the Chronicle.
69
In Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,70 the Third Circuit took a
more expansive view of goodwill and found certain intangible assets insep-
arable from goodwill. In that case, the taxpayer acquired certain newspa-
pers owned by Booth Newspapers, Inc., and allocated $67.8 million of the
purchase price to "paid subscribers" of those newspapers. 7 1 The figure
was an estimate of the future revenues anticipated by the taxpayer to be
derived from existing subscribers to Booth newspapers, who the taxpayer
expected to continue to subscribe after the acquisition. 72 The govern-
ment contended, as it had in Houston Chronicle, that "paid subscribers" rep-
resented an asset indistinguishable from goodwill. 73 The Third Circuit
agreed.7 4 In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Third Circuit, holding the taxpayer had met its burden of proving that
"paid subscribers" was an intangible asset with an ascertainable value and a
limited useful life.
7 5
The issue in Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner76 in-
volved a taxpayer's attempt to amortize an allocable portion of the acquisi-
tion costs it incurred in purchasing the assets of various banks.
Specifically, the taxpayer had claimed amortization deductions for the
65. 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973).
66. Id. at 1243.
67. Id. at 1243-44.
68. Id. at 1244.
69. Id. at 1251, 1266.
70. 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
71. Id. at 556.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 556-57.
74. Id. at 568. The Third Circuit's basic position was that if goodwill is defined as the
.expectancy that old customers will resort to the old place," then "paid subscribers" is the
essence of goodwill. Id.
75. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1670, 1683 (1993). See David
G. Jaeger, Supreme Court Decides Newark Morning Ledger Co., 1 TAXES 406 (1993); Mark Wer-
tlieb, et al., The Amortization of Purchased Intangible Assets, 24 TAX ADviSER 583 (1993). The
Supreme Court noted that the burden of proof faced by taxpayers attempting to make the
required showing with respect to most intangibles is "substantial" and "often will prove too
great to bear." Id. at 1681.
76. 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
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portion of the purchase price allocable to so-called "core deposits" held by
the acquired banks. The Tax Court has in the past held that core deposits
are not, as a matter of law, necessarily an inseparable part of goodwill and
may be amortized if the taxpayer can otherwise satisfy the two-part test
described above. 77 The IRS has never accepted the view that core deposits
are separable from goodwill, and in Colorado National Bankshares, again at-
tempted to find a sympathetic judicial ear for its position that any value
attributable to such deposits may not be amortized.
B. Facts
In 1981 and 1982, the taxpayer, Colorado National Bankshares, Inc.,
purchased seven banks located on the front range in Colorado. Among
the assets acquired were the "core deposits" of the banks, defined by the
taxpayer as deposit liabilities on which no or low interest rates are paid.78
These included funds on deposit from the following types of accounts: (1)
interest-free checking accounts; (2) interest-paying checking accounts,
known as "NOW accounts"; and (3) savings accounts. 79 Core deposits are
highly valued by banks, as they are relatively low cost, reasonably stable,
and relatively insensitive to interest rate changes.8 0 The profitability of a
bank is largely dependant upon its ability to attract such deposits. As a
regulatory matter, and in furtherance of generally accepted accounting
principles, such core deposits are required to be recorded as assets sepa-
rate and apart from goodwill.8 '
Prior to acquiring the assets of the seven banks, the taxpayer had con-
ducted detailed and thorough studies estimating the value of the bank's
assets. The value of the core deposits and their expected lives were esti-
mated as part of this process.8 2 The taxpayer intended to reinvest the core
deposit funds, thereby deriving an income stream from the spread be-
tween the low interest rates paid on the core deposits and the higher rates
at which they would be reinvested.8 3 Based upon a report prepared by
certified public accountants,8 4 the taxpayer characterized the present
value of this projected income stream as an asset, and claimed an amorti-
zation deduction on its 1982, 1983, and 1984 tax returns related to this
asset. The taxpayer amortized the core deposits over useful lives ranging
from three to ten years, depending upon the nature of the accounts con-
77. See IT & S of Iowa, Inc., v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496 (1991); Citizens & Southern
Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463 (1988), aff'd, 900 F.2d 266 (lth Cir. 1990).
78. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 384.
79. Id.
80. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc., v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 772
(1990).
81. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 385.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 775. The methodology-statistical and otherwise-used by the
taxpayer's accountants and advisors in determining the value and useful lives of the core
deposits is described at length in the opinion of the Tax Court. Id. at 775-87. The Tax
Court's opinion is instructive in enabling the reader to appreciate the scope and detail of the
well-prepared analysis used by the taxpayer to carry its burden of proof.
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stituting the core deposits and the identity of the acquired bank to which
they related.
The IRS disallowed the claimed deductions on the ground that the
core deposit intangibles were an inseparable part of the goodwill of the
acquired banks. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer.
8 5
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
Noting that the "[c]ategorization of core deposit intangibles is admit-
tedly a close question,"8 6 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals8 7 sided with
the taxpayer and affirmed the Tax Court.88
The court of appeals was greatly influenced by the fact that the tax-
payer "presented the Tax Court with substantial evidence, and the Tax
Court found, that the core deposit intangibles were separate and distinct
from goodwill, and had both an ascertainable value independent of good-
will and a limited useful life."8 9 The Tenth Circuit determined that the
intangibles were separate from goodwill by relying on various factors, in-
cluding the necessity of the taxpayer is expending substantial additional
time, effort, and expense to produce income from the deposits and the
fact that the deposits could have been transferred apart from any goodwill
of the selling banks.90
In addressing the question of whether the deposits had both an ascer-
tainable value independent of goodwill and a limited useful life, the court
of appeals noted that the taxpayer had not claimed the amortization de-
ductions until after consulting with "certified public accountants conver-
sant in the field," who estimated the value and useful life of the core
deposits. 9 1 The court of appeals noted that these estimates need only be
.a reasonable approximation of value for purposes of depreciation-abso-
lute certainty is not required."92 The court found the estimates "to be
neither arbitrary nor unrealistic," 9 3 and concluded that the "taxpayer has
sustained its burden of demonstrating value and a limited useful life for
the core deposit intangibles."
94
D. Summary
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Colorado Na-
tional Bankshares is illustrative of the court's willingness to give credence to
a taxpayer's determination that a particular intangible asset may be amor-
tized. As to the specific issue raised in the case, however, the import of the
85. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 771.
86. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 387.
87. The three-judge panel consisted of Chief Judge McKay, Judge McWilliams, and
Judge Kelly. Id. at 384.
88. Id. at 387.
89. Id. at 385.
90. Id. at 387.
91. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 984 F.2d at 385.
92. Id. at 386.
93. Id. at 385.
94. Id. at 386.
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decision is mitigated by the enactment of I.R.C. § 197 as part of the Reve-
nue Reconciliation Act of 1993. 95 Under the Act, effective for acquisitions
after August 10, 1993, so-called "section 197 intangibles" are required to
be amortized on a straight-line basis over a period of 15 years.9 6 A "section
197 intangible" is defined to include, inter alia, goodwill, 97 going-concern
value, 98 workforce in place, information base, know-how, customer-based
intangibles, supplier-based intangibles, licenses, permits, or other rights
granted by a governmental unit or agency, covenants not to complete, and
franchises, trademarks, and tradenames.9 9 As relevant to the issue in Colo-
rado National Bankshares, the term "customer-based intangibles" is specifi-
cally defined to include the deposit base and any similar asset of a
financial institution.1 00 According to the House Committee Report, "simi-
lar assets" include items such as checking accounts, savings accounts, and
escrow accounts.10 1 Core deposit intangibles such as those identified by
the taxpayer in Colorado National Bankshares will, under these new rules, be
required to be amortized ratably over 15 years, and not over the much
shorter period used by the taxpayer in that case.
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT EXPLORES APPLICATION OF 100% PENALTY
OF I.R.C. § 6672: DENBO V. UNIrFD STATS 1 0 2 AND
MUCK V UNITED STA TE
"1 0 3
A. Background
Employers are required under the Internal Revenue Code to pay over
to the IRS a variety of taxes imposed in respect of their employees, gener-
ally referred to as "employment taxes" 10 4 and "withholding taxes." 10 5
Some of these taxes are deducted and withheld from the payroll checks of
95. Title XIII, Chapter 1, of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
96. I.R.C. § 197(a) (West Supp. 1993). Generally speaking, this new rule applies only to
assets acquired by the taxpayer from an unrelated third party, and not to self-created in-
tangibles. Id. § 197(c) (2).
97. Id. § 197(d)(1)(A). The House Committee Report defines goodwill as "the value of
a trade or business that is attributable to the expectancy of continued customer patronage,
whether due to the name of a trade or business, the reputation of a trade or business, or any
other factor." H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 993.
98. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993). Going concern value is defined by the
House Committee Report as "the additional element of value of a trade or business that
attaches to property by reason of its existence as an integral part of a going concern. Going
concern value includes the value that is attributable to the ability of a trade or business to
continue to function and generate income without interruption notwithstanding a change in
ownership." H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 993.
99. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(C)-(F) (West Supp. 1993).
100. I.R.C. § 197(d) (2) (B) (West Supp. 1993).
101. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 763 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
378, 994.
102. 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993).
103. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993).
104. See I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
105. See I.R.C. § 3402 (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
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the employees, and others consist of a "matching portion" that is imposed
on the employer.
As part of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA),' 0 6 a tax is
imposed on employees and employers consisting of two parts: old-age, sur-
vivor, and disability insurance (OASDI) 10 7 and Medicare hospital insur-
ance (HI).' 0 8 For wages paid in 1994 to covered employees, the HI tax
rate is 1.45% of the employee's wages.109 The employer is required to
withhold the HI tax from the wages of each employee as a payroll deduc-
tion and periodically remit the same over to the IRS. 110 In addition, the
employer is required to "match" the employee's HI contribution by paying
over to the IRS an additional 1.45% of the employee's wages.' The
OASDI tax rate is 6.2%,112 and in 1994 is imposed on the first $60,600 of
the employee's wages. The OASDI tax is likewise withheld from the em-
ployee's wages through payroll deductions, and is also matched by the
employer. 113
Moreover, as part of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),114
a tax is imposed, on employers only, equal in 1994 to 6% of the wages of
each employee,' 15 subject to certain credits depending on the level of con-
tributions the employer is required to make into the state unemployment
fund under the state's unemployment compensation law. 16
The foregoing taxes are generally referred to as "employment taxes."
In addition to being responsible for withholding and paying over the em-
ployee's portion of employment taxes, employers are also obligated under
the Internal Revenue Code to withhold federal income taxes from the em-
ployee's wages in each payroll period based upon income tax withholding
tables published by the IRS. 117 The amounts withheld from an employ-
ees' paycheck-including the employee's portion of employment taxes-
are sometimes referred to as "withholding taxes."
Employment taxes generally fall into one of two categories, "trust
fund" taxes and "non-trust fund" taxes. Amounts withheld by an employer
from an employee's wages, such as the employee's withheld income taxes
and the employee's share of social security taxes, are considered to be
held by the employer in trust for the government pending their payment
over to the Internal Revenue Service." 8 Such taxes are generally referred
to as the trust fund portion of employment taxes. 1 9 The employer's
106. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
107. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (1988).
108. I.R.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b) (1988).
109. Id.
110. I.R.C. § 3102(a) (1988).
111. I.R.C. § 3111(b) (1988).
112. I.R.C. § 3101(a) (1988).
113. I.R.C. § 3102(a) (1988).
114. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
115. I.R.C. § 3301 (1988).
116. I.R.C. § 3302 (1988 & Supp, IV 1992).
117. I.R.C. § 3402 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
118. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (1988).
119. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1978).
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matching share of social security taxes, as well as federal unemployment
taxes, constitute the non-trust fund portion.
When a corporation fails to pay its trust fund taxes, the United States
Treasury suffers the loss, because the employees from whose wages the
amounts were withheld nevertheless are credited in full for the withheld
amounts even though they are not paid over to the government. This is
especially true where the employer goes out of business. 120 To remedy
this situation, I.R.C. § 6672121 provides that any person required to col-
lect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax-such as the trust fund
portion of employment taxes-and who willfully fails to do so, is liable to
the government for the full amount of the taxes not collected, accounted
for, or paid over. The § 6672 penalty, also known as the "100% pen-
alty," 12 2 is frequently asserted by the Service when withheld trust fund
taxes are left unpaid by a corporation.'
23
The persons required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over
the subject taxes are referred to as "responsible persons."1 24 Generally
speaking, the IRS will look to the officers, directors, and shareholders of
the employer, plus others with check-signing authority, in attempting to
affix "responsible person" status for purposes of imposing the 100% pen-
alty. Due to the conjunctive nature in which the elements of liability are
set out in I.R.C. § 6672, a person is not liable for the 100% penalty unless
(1) he was a "responsible person" with respect to the unpaid taxes, and (2)
he acted willfully in failing to see that the taxes were paid. 125
Liability for the 100% penalty is joint and several. 126 The IRS may
impose the penalty, in full, on as many responsible persons as can be iden-
tified with respect to a particular trust fund tax liability. 12 7
120. If the employer goes out of business, the government suffers the loss of the non-trust
fund taxes as well, which are unlikely ever to be recovered from the employer and cannot be
asserted as part of the 100% penalty. "Once the corporation is out of business, the United
States can kiss goodbye any non-trust fund taxes owed it but not paid." United States v.
Schroeder, 900 F.2d 1144, 1146 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990).
121. I.R.C. § 6672 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
122. Although these exactions are frequently termed a penalty, such description "does
not alter their essential character as taxes." United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978).
123. It has been held that the pendency of a corporate bankruptcy does not prevent the
Service from pursuing the principals of the corporate debtor to collect the 100% penalty, as
the latter is a "separate and distinct" obligation. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783
F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986). However, the courts are in disagreement as to whether the
Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to determine the § 6672 liability of the principals of a
corporate debtor when they themselves are not "debtors" in the bankruptcy. Compare In re
Brandt-Airflex Corp., 843 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (no) with Quattrone Accountants, Inc., v.
I.R.S., 895 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1990) (yes). It is settled, however, that the Bankruptcy Court
does have the authority to order the government to apply tax payments made by a chapter 11
corporate debtor, first, to the corporation's trust fund tax liability, then to the non-trust fund
liability. United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
124. McCray v. United States, 910 F.2d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
921 (1991). SeeJoseph S. Merrill, IRS HAS BROAD POWER TO FIND PAYROLL TAX REsPONSIBIL-
flY, 20 TAX'N FOR LAwYEas 76 (1991).
125. Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 733-36 (5th Cir. 1983).
126. See McCray, 910 F.2d at 1290; Brown v. United States, 591 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (5th
Cir. 1979).
127. It is the policy of the IRS to collect the 100% penalty in full from each responsible
person it can identify as to a particular withholding tax delinquency. IRM [57(16) (0)] 723 (1-
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Two cases decided in 1993, Denbo v. United States128 and Muck v. United
States,129 presented the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals with the opportu-
nity to explore the -factors employed by the courts in determining liability
for the 100% penalty.
B. Facts
1. Denbo v. United States
John Denbo was the secretary-treasurer of Louisiane Restaurants, Inc.,
an Oklahoma corporation in which he was a fifty percent shareholder.
The other fifty percent of the stock of the corporation was held by Robert
Allred, the president of the company. °3 0 Denbo served as a director of the
corporation and as its secretary-treasurer. Allred conducted the day-to day
affairs of the company, and signed all checks (including payroll checks)
written on the corporation's bank account.1 3 ' While Denbo also had
check signing authority, he did not actually sign any company checks dur-
ing the period in question.
132
The corporation experienced financial difficulties from its inception.
Denbo was substantially involved in efforts to keep the company afloat,
obtaining various loans which he personally guaranteed and which were
secured by pledges of his personal assets.' 33 Beginning in September
1986, Denbo became aware that the company was not paying its payroll
taxes. Subsequently, in November 1987, Denbo attended a meeting with
IRS personnel to discuss a payment plan for bringing the unpaid taxes
current.13 4 However, Denbo never personally saw to it that the company
paid the taxes, relying instead on Allred's assurances that they were being
paid.'3 5 Sometime in 1989, Denbo bought all but ten percent of the re-
maining stock in the company from Allred, and the two parted ways.
13 6
In May 1990, the IRS assessed Denbo over $107,000 in the form of the
100% penalty.' 3 7 After paying a portion of the assessment,' 3 8 Denbo
14-84). This can result in the IRS collecting the unpaid taxes many times over, although the
IRS may suspend collection activities against other responsible persons if it has collected in
full from one or more of them. IRM 5638.3 (6-3-91). The practice of the IRS is to hold the
funds collected from multiple responsible persons until after the statute of limitations for
refund claims has passed as to each of them, and then rebate to the responsible persons any
funds collected from them in excess of the trust fund taxes (plus penalties and interest)
actually owed. Id.
128. 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993).
129. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993).





135. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1031.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Withholding taxes are divisible. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 171 n.37, 175
n.38 (1960). Therefore, taxpayers may initiate refund proceedings by paying only the unpaid
taxes for one employee for one quarter (usually stipulated by the IRS to equal $100), and
then filing a claim for refund. The government will then counterclaim for the balance of the
assessment. See I.R.C. § 6672(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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filed suit for refund, and the government counterclaimed for the remain-
der of the assessment.13 9 Denbo's case was tried to a jury, which found
Denbo liable as a responsible person who willfully failed to pay over the
subject taxes. 140 Denbo appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2. Muck v. United States
Ronald Muck was the president and sole shareholder of Graystone
Castle, Ltd., a Colorado corporation that owned and operated a hotel in
Thornton, Colorado. 141 The corporation failed to pay over employee
withholding taxes for the last quarter of 1988 and the first two quarters of
1989. In response to a notice of intent to levy from the IRS, Muck paid a
portion of the claimed taxes and sued for refund, seeking to establish that
he was not the "responsible person" liable for the 100% penalty as to these
taxes. 142 The government counterclaimed, asserting the 100% penalty
against Muck for all unpaid withholding taxes for the three quarters in
question. 143 In an unreported decision, the district court granted the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against
Muck in the amount of approximately $95,000.144 Muck appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinions
1. Denbo v. United States
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 145 affirmed Denbo's
liability for the 100% penalty.
14 6
The court of appeals first addressed the "responsible person" element
of I.R.C. § 6672. Denbo contended that Allred, not Denbo, had exclusive
authority over the financial affairs of the corporation, including the hiring
and firing of all employees, the signing of all corporate checks, including
payroll checks, and the review and signing of payroll tax returns. Denbo
claimed that this absolved him of any responsibility for the 100% pen-
alty.14 7 The court acknowledged that Allred may in fact have exercised
greater control over the affairs of the corporation than Denbo, but did not
see this possibility as dispositive of whether Denbo also had status as a
responsible person. The court noted that the responsible person "gener-
139. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1031.
140. Id. at 1032.




145. The three-judge panel consisted ofJudges Anderson, Barrett, and Tacha. Denbo, 988
F.2d at 1030.
146. Id. at 1031. Ajury verdict will not be overturned unless the appellate court finds that
no reasonable jury could have reached such a verdict based on the evidence presented. E.g.,
Acrey v. American Sheep Indus. Ass'n, 981 F.2d 1569, 1575 (10th Cir. 1992).
147. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032.
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ally is, but need not be, a managing officer or employee, and there may be
more than one responsible person."
148
The court stated that the indicia of responsible person status may in-
clude "the holding of corporate office, control over financial affairs, the
authority to disburse corporate funds, stock ownership, and the ability to
hire and fire employees,"1 49 and that the person had" 'significant, though
not necessarily exclusive, authority in the general management and fiscal
decisionmaking of the corporation.' "15o The court found ample evidence
in the record to support a determination that Denbo was a responsible
person in the instant case. The "undisputed facts" as summarized above,
"along with Denbo's 50% stock ownership and status as an officer and
director of the corporation, demonstrate that he possessed 'significant au-
thority in the.., fiscal decisionmaking of the corporation.' "1151 In light of
Denbo's position and involvement with the company, the court decided
that Denbo had the power to direct the company to pay the taxes in ques-
tion. Noting that " '[a]uthority to pay [in the context of section 6672]
means effective power to pay,' "152 the court concluded that Denbo's "finan-
cial involvement in the corporation, along with his check-signing author-
ity, gave him the effective power to see to it that the taxes were paid."
1 53
There was therefore sufficient evidence before the jury from which it
could find that Denbo was a responsible person as to the corporation's
unpaid payroll taxes.
The court then turned to the second element of liability under I.R.C.
§ 6672, which requires that the responsible person must have acted will-
fully in failing to collect, account for, and pay over the payroll taxes.
1 54
The court noted that "[w] illfulness, in the context of section 6672, means a
'voluntary, conscious and intentional decision to prefer other creditors
over the Government.' "155 While mere negligence will not satisfy this ele-
ment, reckless conduct will: it is established that" ' [t] he willfulness require-
ment is .. .met if the responsible officer shows a reckless disregard of a
known or obvious risk that trust funds may not be remitted to the govern-
ment.' 156 Denbo conceded he was aware the trust fund taxes in question
were not being paid, but contended his failure to follow up on his knowl-
edge and investigate the status of the taxes in more detail amounted
merely to negligent conduct insufficient to establish willfulness.1 57 The
court disagreed, noting that "[a] responsible person's failure to investigate
148. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032 (citing Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th
Cir. 1976)).
149. Id. (citing Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1987) and
Gebhart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1987)).
150. Id. (quoting Kizzier v. United States, 598 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1979)).
151. Id. (quoting Kizzier, 598 F.2d at 1132).
152. Id. at 1033 (quoting Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 1983)).
153. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Burden v. United States, 486 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 904 (1974)).
156. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 894 F.2d 1549, 1554 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1990)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id.
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or to correct mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes
have not been paid satisfies the § 6672 willfulness requirement."1 5 8
Although Denbo was aware of the problem by September 1986, and subse-
quently met with the IRS concerning the matter, he continued to rely on
Allred's assurances that the taxes were being taken care of and that the
matter had been "worked out" with the IRS.159 The court concluded that
Denbo "cannot escape lability by claiming that he relied on the assurances
of others."16° Because Denbo "was aware that the corporation had de-
faulted in its payment of employment taxes but nevertheless disregarded a
known risk by relying on the assurances of Allred instead of doing more,"
Denbo was held to have willfully failed to pay over the taxes.16 1
Denbo also argued that the rule laid down in Slodov v. United States1 62
absolved him from liability. 1 63 In Slodov, the Supreme Court held that if
new management assumes control of a corporation when a trust fund de-
linquency already exists but the withheld taxes have already been dissi-
pated by the prior management, the new management's use of after-
acquired funds to pay other creditors in preference to the government
does not make it liable for the 100% penalty. The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals easily distinguished Slodov from the circumstances in Denbo. In
Slodov, the members of new management were found to be "without per-
sonal fault," and where there was no nexus between the after-acquired
funds and the trust fund delinquency, imposition of the 100% penalty on
the new management was found to be improper. 164 Here, Denbo simply
was not "new management." He "was responsible both at the time taxes
went unpaid and at the time the government sought to collect them under
§ 6672."165 Therefore, the 100% penalty was appropriately imposed.' 66
2. Muck v. United States
167
First addressing the question of whether Muck was a responsible per-
son, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered Muck's primary con-
158. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033 (citing Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1033-34.
161. Id. at 1034.
162. 436 U.S. 238 (1978).
163. Denbo had sought a broad jury instruction that suggested he could not be liable for
the 100% penalty. The proposed jury instruction stated that the 100% penalty could not be
imposed for a failure to cause funds to be applied against the deficiency when the corpora-
tion obtained such funds after the unpaid taxes arose. See Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1035 n.4.
164. Slodon, 436 U.S. at 254.
165. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1035.
166. Id. Denbo also argued as error the failure of the trial judge to issue jury instructions
which would have incorporated the Supreme Court's definition of "willfulness" in Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). In Cheek, the Supreme Court held that a good-faith
misunderstanding of the tax laws need not be "objectively reasonable" in order to negate
willfulness in criminal tax prosecutions. Id. at 203. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial judge, however, that this standard had no application to a provision of
the Internal Revenue Code imposing civil liability. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1034.
167. 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993). The three-judge panel consisted of ChiefJudge McKay
and Judges Barrett and Seth. Id. at 1380.
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tention that the day-to-day operations of Graystone Castle were performed
by a business manager who made all decisions concerning the disburse-
ment of funds and the selection of which creditors were to be paid.
168
Noting that a similar argument had been made in the recently-decided
Denbo case, the court reiterated the rule that the existence of" 'significant,
though not necessarily exclusive, authority in the general management
and fiscal decisionmaking of the corporation' "169 is determinative, "irre-
spective of whether that authority is actually exercised." 170 The court
pointed out that Muck was the sole shareholder of the company, had the
authority as president of the corporation to manage the business and af-
fairs of the company, had the power to borrow money on behalf of the
corporation, had check signing authority, and had the power to suspend
the company's business if payroll taxes were not being paid.17 1 "These
indicia of authority are sufficient to establish [Muck's] status as a responsi-
ble party for § 6672 purposes."
172
Muck also argued that, even if he was a responsible person with re-
spect to the unpaid payroll taxes, he nevertheless did not act willfully in
failing to pay them over to the IRS, and therefore, the second element of
liability under I.R.C. § 6672 was not present. 173 In evaluating this ele-
ment, the court noted that "[w]illfulness is present whenever a responsible
person 'acts or fails to act consciously and voluntarily and with knowledge
or intent that as a result of his action or inaction trust funds belonging to
the government will not be paid over but will be used for other pur-
poses.' "174 In making his argument that he did not act willfully, Muck,
like Denbo, invoked Slodov. 175 Muck contended that he did not learn of
the unpaid taxes until the latter part of the second quarter of 1989.
Therefore, as to the deficiencies for the last quarter of 1988 and the first
quarter of 1989, he did not act willfully in failing to pay them over.1 76 Just
as in Denbo, the court had little trouble disposing of this argument.'
77
Muck's "decision here to pay creditors of Graystone after he learned that
withholding taxes were owing to the government was conscious and
intentional."
178
In his final argument, Muck asserted that the corporation had en-
tered into a payment agreement with the IRS to bring the unpaid with-
168. Id. at 1380-81.
169. Id. at 1381 (quoting Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032 (quoting Kizzier, 598 F.2d at 1132)).
170. Id.
171. Id
172. Muck, 3 F.3d at 1381.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d 236, 240 (8th Cir. 1991)).
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Muck, 3 F.3d at 1381-82. The court noted that" 'Slodor does not relieve a "responsi-
ble person" of the responsibility to reduce accrued withholding tax liability with funds ac-
quired after the funds actually withheld have been dissipated so long as the person
responsible has been so throughout the period the withholding tax liability accrued and
thereafter.' " Id. at 1381 (quoting Garsky v. United States, 600 F.2d 86, 91 (7th Cir. 1979)
(alteration in original)).
178. id. at 1382.
1994] 1081
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
holding taxes current. 179 Given the presence of the payment agreement,
Muck argued that his failure to cause the taxes to be paid could not be
willful. 18 0 The court of appeals rejected this argument, pointing out that
"[t]he liability of the corporation is separate and distinct from [Muck's]
liability to collect and pay over withholding taxes.... Only if [Muck] can
establish that the agreement specifically provided that he, individually,
would be held harmless can the presence of the agreement relieve him of
personal liability."1 8'
Muck's liability for the 100% penalty was therefore affirmed.
18 2
D. Summary
As recognized by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the operation of
the 100% penalty can be "harsh." 183 The court's recent opinions in Denbo
and Muck illustrate the severe consequences that can befall responsible
persons if trust fund taxes are not paid over to the IRS by the employer to
which the responsible person is linked. The responsible person or per-
sons will be called upon to make good the loss to the government. The
fact that an individual may play a comparatively passive role in the opera-
tions of the employer is not helpful in shielding that individual from liabil-
ity for the 100% penalty, even if others are more active in those operations
and may bear a higher degree of blame for the nonpayment of the taxes.
Personal liability for the 100% penalty is joint and several, and if the indi-
vidual otherwise stands in the position of a responsible person with respect
to the unpaid taxes, he will be liable to the same extent as any other per-
son also determined to be a responsible person as to those taxes.
The Tenth Circuit's opinions in Denbo and Muck also underscore the
limited scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Slodov. Simply because a
responsible person does not learn of unpaid trust fund taxes until after
the taxes were due and payable does not aid the individual in a claim that
he could not have acted willfully in failing to see that they were paid. So
long as corporate funds are still on hand and have not been dissipated,
and so long as the individual in question stood in the position of a respon-
sible person at the time the taxes went unpaid, the individual's failure to
discharge the accrued trust fund liability with corporate funds will be seen
as willful, and not falling under the special rule in Slodov.
179. Id.
180. Id. It is unclear from the reported opinion whether the IRS entered its assessment
against Muck while the corporation was still timely performing the payment agreement or
only after the corporation had defaulted under the agreement.
181. Id. (citing Olsen, 952 F.2d at 241 and Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1218
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970)).
182. Id.
183. Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1035 (1993).
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IV. BAD DEBT DEDUCTION PERMITTED FOR LOANs MADE TO
CORPORATION BY SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEE:
L_7wv v UNrro STA Is 
8 4
A. Background
Under I.R.C. § 166(a), a creditor holding a debt that becomes wholly
worthless may claim a bad debt deduction for the full amount of the debt
in the taxable year in which it became worthless. 185 Such a bad debt de-
duction is allowed to the taxpayer as an ordinary loss, which is deductible
in full against the taxpayer's gross income.
1 86
On the other hand, I.R.C. § 166(d) provides an exception to this rule,
stating that so-called "nonbusiness debts" do not give rise to ordinary loss
deductions if they become worthless. 187 Rather, the loss suffered by the
holder of the debt is characterized as a short-term capital loss. 18 8 As such,
it may only be offset and "netted" against other capital gains, 189 and to the
extent a net capital loss results, may only be deducted by an individual
taxpayer to a limit of $3,000,190 subject to certain carry-backs and carry-
forwards.
19 1
I.R.C. § 166 therefore relegates bad debt losses in respect to "nonbusi-
ness" debts to short-term capital loss treatment, while all other types of
debts, known as "business" bad debts, will qualify for deduction as ordinary
losses if they become worthless. For purposes of the bad debt deduction,
therefore, the characterization of the debt as either a nonbusiness debt or
a business debt is of great importance to the taxpayer suffering the loss.
The Internal Revenue Code defines a nonbusiness debt in the nega-
tive, by defining it as any debt other than one created or acquired in con-
nection with a trade or business of the taxpayer, or other than a debt the
loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or
business. 192 All debts which cannot be characterized as nonbusiness debts
will be treated as business debts.
Generally, when a debt becomes worthless and the taxpayer claims a
deduction in connection with the loss, the taxpayer will seek to character-
ize the debt as a business debt so as to achieve ordinary loss treatment.
The IRS may challenge the characterization by asserting that the debt was
in fact a nonbusiness debt giving rise only to a short-term capital loss upon
its worthlessness.19 3 Applicable Treasury Regulations provide that in or-
der to meet this challenge and deduct the loss as a business bad debt, the
184. 983 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1993).
185. I.R.C. § 166(a)(1) (1988).
186. See I.R.C. § 166(a),(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
187. I.R.C. § 166(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
188. See id.
189. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1988 & Supp. V 1992) for the rules by which long-term capital
gains and losses and short-term capital gains and losses are netted against one another to
produce a net capital gain or loss.
190. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1988).
191. See I.R.C. § 1212 (1988).
192. I.R.C. § 166(d)(2) (1988).
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(a) (2) (1980).
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taxpayer must show that the bad debt loss was "proximate" to the conduct
of a trade or business by the taxpayer, or that the debt was created in the
course of a trade or business of the taxpayer.
194
In United States v. Generes,19 5 the Supreme Court held that where the
taxpayer is both an employee and a shareholder of a corporation which is
indebted to the taxpayer, the taxpayer's "dominant motivation" underly-
ing the transaction at issue determines whether the transaction is proxi-
mately related to the taxpayer's trade or business.' 9 6 If the dominant
motivation in the transaction that created the debt was business-related,
the debt will be characterized as a business debt.19 7 Such a motivation will
be seen to be present where the debt was created in the context of a trans-
action by which the taxpayer sought to protect his status as an employee of
the corporation.' 98 On the other hand, where the dominant motivation
was investment-related, the debt will be seen to be a nonbusiness debt.
Therefore, where the dominant motivation of the taxpayer was to protect
his investment, rather than his status as an employee, the debt will be char-
acterized as a nonbusiness debt. This determination is necessarily a ques-
tion of fact, generally reserved to the trial court.' 99
In Kelson v. United States,2 00 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "objective facts surrounding loans, rather than the [shareholder-em-
ployee's] subjective intent, control"20 1 in determining the shareholder-em-
ployee's dominant motivation in entering into a transaction giving rise to
a loan to his corporation. The Tenth Circuit therefore employs an objec-
tive test, rather than a subjective test, in classifying debts as business or
nonbusiness debts.
Regarding transactions between a corporation and a taxpayer who is
one of the corporation's shareholder-employees, the bad debt deduction
is not limited to circumstances involving direct loans from the taxpayer to
the corporation. The deduction may also arise out of personal guarantees
made by the taxpayer in connection with corporate debts. 20 2 A taxpayer
providing a personal guarantee of corporate debts will have a right of sub-
rogation against or contribution from the corporation in respect to
amounts the guarantor is required to pay if called upon to perform under
the guarantee. If the taxpayer is unable to recover from the corporation
or the right to do so is or becomes worthless, the taxpayer may seek to
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b) (1980).
195. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
196. Id. at 103.
197. IM.
198. That is, the taxpayer will be seen as having entered into the transaction to protect
the trade or business of being an employee.
199. Under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses." FED. R. Cirv. P. 52(a). Thus, the trial court's findings of fact will be upheld
unless the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake has been made. E.g., Las Vegas Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1990).
200. 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974).
201. Id. at 1293.
202. See Generes, 405 U.S. at 98.
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claim a bad debt deduction for the amount paid by the taxpayer under the
guarantee. 20 3 The classification of such a deduction as arising from a busi-
ness debt or a nonbusiness debt will depend upon the dominant motiva-
tion of the taxpayer in providing the guarantee. 20 4 If that motivation was
to protect the status of the guarantor as an employee, as opposed to pro-
tecting his investment in the corporation, the bad debt will be character-




Harry Litwin was a petroleum engineer who had started a number of
successful businesses. In 1980, he founded Advanced Fuel Systems
("AFS"), which was engaged in providing and installing alternative fuel
systems, such as compressed gas and propane, for motor vehicles.20 6 Lit-
win initially was the principal shareholder of AFS, and throughout its life
also served as its chief executive officer and chairman of the board.
The company did not prosper, and in 1983 it filed for Chapter 11
reorganization and then later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation bank-
ruptcy.2 0 7 During AFS's brief life, Litwin had loaned the company various
sums, and had personally guaranteed certain third party loans to the com-
pany. In connection with AFS's demise, Litwin incurred several monetary
losses, including (1) $150,000 he personally loaned to the company, (2)
$350,000 paid to a third party lender to discharge his obligations as a per-
sonal guarantor of a company loan, and (3) $118,674.08 representing cer-
tain other amounts asserted by Litwin to have been advanced by him on
behalf of AFS.20 8 Litwin claimed all of the foregoing losses as bad debt
deductions-that is, as ordinary losses-under I.R.C. § 166(a).209 The
IRS disallowed certain of the deductions in full and recharacterized the
remaining deductions as short term capital losses on the theory that they
were nonbusiness losses, rather than business losses.
2 10
After paying the deficiency and filing a partially successful refund
claim,21 1 Litwin initiated a refund suit in district court. Following a
bench trial, the district court found for Litwin on his entire claim, holding
that the losses were incurred in transactions entered into with a business
203. See id. at 99.
204. Id. at 103.
205. See id. at 104.
206. Litwin v. United States, 983 F.2d 997, 998 (10th Cir. 1993).
207. Id. at 998-99.
208. Id. at 999. The third figure included $75,097 in legal fees incurred in a suit to col-
lect against other guarantors of AFS debts, $33,577.08 in legal fees incurred in defending a
counterclaim asserted by an AFS distributor, and a $10,000 advance made by Litwin to an-
other distributor. Litwin's bad debt deduction in respect to these amounts was based upon
his alleged right to collect these amounts back from AFS. Id.
209. Litwin also asserted that certain of these expenditures were alternatively deductible
under I.R.C. § 162 as ordinary and necessary business expenses. In any event, this issue was
not reached by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
210. Id.
211. Litwin was successful in having a portion of his deduction for legal fees, which had
been disallowed almost in its entirely, reinstated. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 999.
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purpose, and therefore gave rise to ordinary loss deductions as business
bad debts under I.R.C. § 166(a).2 12 The government appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals2 13 affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court.2 14 After recognizing that the Tenth Circuit ap-
plies an objective, rather than subjective, test in determining a taxpayer's
dominant motivation in entering into the transaction giving rise to the
bad debt,2 1 5 the court noted that "courts appear to . . . focus[ ] on three
objective factors in determining a [shareholder-employee's] dominant mo-
tivation: (1) the size of taxpayer's investment, (2) the size of taxpayer's
after-tax salary, and (3) other sources of gross income available to the tax-
payer."2 16 Where a taxpayer's investment in the subject corporation is rel-
atively large, his salary is relatively small, and he has other sources of
relatively large income, the courts are more likely to find that the domi-
nant motivation of the taxpayer in extending the debt was nonbusiness,
that is, designed to protect the taxpayer's investment in the corporation
rather than his status as an employee of the corporation.
21 7
Based on these criteria, the Tenth Circuit had no problem in af-
firming the district court's determination that Litwin's dominant motiva-
tion in loaning money to AFS, guaranteeing AFS's debts, and advancing
money on its behalf was to protect his status as an employee, rather than
his investment in the company.2 18 First, the testimony and other evidence
indicated that Litwin started the company and sought to keep it afloat in
order to remain active as a salaried employee and be useful to society,
goals best achieved by someone of Litwin's advanced age by running his
own company.21 9 Second, Litwin was in fact very active in AFS's day-to-day
affairs, and his relationship with the company was not that of a passive
investor. 220 Third, although Litwin had deferred his salary for three years,
the evidence indicated that he intended to begin drawing it once the com-
pany's cash flow problems had eased. Furthermore, his efforts that gave
rise to the losses in question were aimed at resolving those problems.
22 1
In any event, even if Litwin's deferral of his salary could be taken as an
indication that his motives were investment-oriented rather than employ-
ment-oriented, this one fact is not dispositive. Fourth, Litwin's loans, guar-
antees, and advances were three times the value of his investment in the
212. Id.
213. The three judge panel consisted ofJudges Baldock and Seth, andJudge Clarence A.
Brimmer, District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by
designation. Id at 998.
214. I at 1001.
215. IM. at 1000 (citing Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1293 (10th Cir. 1974)).
216. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 999.
217. See id.






company, indicating his motives to be other that the protection of that
investment.
222
In light of the foregoing evidence, the court of appeals upheld the
trial court's conclusion 22 3 that "Litwin's dominant motivation ... was busi-
ness, not investment, related." 224 Therefore, Litwin's various losses could
be claimed by him as ordinary bad debt deductions under I.R.C. § 166(a).
D. Summary
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Litwin did not
attempt a definitive exposition of the law concerning the deductibility of
bad debts by shareholder-employees. The court did make it clear, how-
ever, that it will apply the three-factor objective test recited above in deter-
mining the motivation of such a taxpayer in entering into the transaction
that gave rise to the claimed loss. If the dominant motivation was to pro-
tect the shareholder-employee's trade or business as an employee, the tax-
payer will be allowed to deduct the loss as a bad debt under I.R.C.
§ 166(a). On the other hand, if the dominant motivation of the taxpayer,
as determined in accordance with the objective factors, was to protect his
investment in the corporation, the bad debt loss can be claimed, if at all,
only as a short-term capital loss.
V. SUMMARY OF OTHER CASES DECIDED BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN 1993
A. Some Decisions of Note
In Anthony v. United States,225 the taxpayers had been issued a statutory
Notice of Deficiency for the tax years 1978, 1979, and 1980, in which the
IRS asserted a deficiency in the amount of $32,735.64.226 Following the
filing of a Tax Court petition by the taxpayers, the matter was settled for
$15,367.00.227 The "decision document" evidencing the settlement con-
tained a "finality clause," stating that the settlement agreement constituted
"a final civil settlement of taxes due for the years in question."2 28 The
document was signed by the taxpayers and an authorized IRS representa-
tive and entered as a final decision of the Tax Court in early 1987.229 Sub-
sequently, the IRS instituted activities to collect not only the $15,367.00
figure stipulated, but also interest on the deficiency in an additional
amount in excess of $19,000.00.230 The taxpayers paid the total sought by
the IRS, then filed suit for refund in the district court.23 1 The district
court held that the term "taxes" as used in the decision document in-
222. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 1001.
223. In other words, the trial court's finding of fact was not "clearly erroneous." See supra
note 199.
224. Litwin, 983 F.2d at 1001.
225. 987 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1993).




230. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 672.
231. Anthony v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 656, 656 (D. Colo. 1991).
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cluded interest, and entered summaryjudgment for the taxpayers. 232 The
court ordered the IRS not only to refund the interest, but also to pay the
taxpayers' reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
2 33
In affirming the district court in Anthony, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that the settlement document did not satisfy the statutory
requirements for either a compromise, as asserted by the taxpayers, or a
closing agreement, as contended by the IRS. 2 3 4 The former would have
constituted final payment, including interest, while the latter would not.
The document was therefore seen to be open to interpretation. Finding
the agreement nevertheless to be a valid stipulation by the parties,23 5 the
court proceeded to construe the document in the taxpayers' favor. 23 6 The
court noted that the "finality clause" quoted above was added to the docu-
ment because of the taxpayers' concern that the settlement be final and
that it resolve all civil aspects of the case. 23 7 The evidence reflected that
the IRS attorney handling the matter had so assured the taxpayers.
238
Conversely, despite the IRS's claim that it rarely waives interest and that
the IRS most likely so informed the taxpayers that interest was a separate
element of the settlement, the IRS could produce no specific evidence
that the taxpayers were so informed. The court further noted the rule of
construction that resolves an ambiguity against the draftsman, and applied
it against the IRS. 23 9 In this regard, the court noted that "where the gov-
ernment enters into an agreement with its citizens, it has a duty to act with
at least a 'minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability.' "240 The
court concluded that this standard was not satisfied in the present case.
Finding no material issue of fact, the court upheld the district court's en-
try of summary judgment.24 1 In addition, the appellate court upheld the
imposition of litigation costs against the IRS, 2 4 2 although it remanded the
question of whether the costs imposed by the district court were in fact
reasonable.
2 43
232. 1& at 657.
233. d.
234. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 673. See I.R.C. §§ 7121, 7122 (1988).
235. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 673. Informal agreements to settle tax disputes are generally
held to be invalid, and it is usually necessary for the agreement to satisfy the formal statutory
guidelines for compromises, closing agreements, and the like. Uinta Livestock Corp. v.
United States, 355 F.2d 761, 765 (10th Cir. 1966).
236. See Anthony, 987 F.2d at 674.
237. Id. at 673.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 674.
240. Id. at 674 (quoting Heckler v. Community Health Serv., 467 U.S. 51, 61 (1984)).
241. Id.
242. Anthony, 987 F2d at 674. Such costs may be recovered by the taxpayer against the
government if the taxpayer is able to prove that (1) all administrative remedies have been
exhausted, (2) the requested award constitutes "reasonable litigation costs," and (3) the tax-
payer is the "prevailing party" in the matter. I.RC. § 7430 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
243. Id. at 675. Attorney's fees awarded under I.RC. § 7430 cannot exceed $75 per hour,
adjusted for cost of living increases and "special factors." I.R.C. § 7430(c) (1) (B) (iii) (1988).
The record before the Court of Appeals was insufficient for it to make a determination on
this question. Anthony, 987 F.2d at 675.
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In Angle v. Commissioner,2 44 the taxpayer timely filed his 1982 federal
income tax return on which he reported a $453,638 tax preference item in
the form of excess intangible drilling costs. 245 In 1984, the taxpayer filed
a timely refund claim in which he reduced the amount of the tax prefer-
ence item.2 46 In 1986, he again filed a refund claim pertaining to his 1982
taxes, this time based on a net operating loss from 1984, and again recal-
culated his excess intangible drilling costs. 247 Finally, in 1989, he filed a
third refund claim, asserting that in fact he had no excess intangible drill-
ing costs at all in 1982 because his excess percentage depletion 248 should
have been added back to his income from oil and gas operations in deter-
mining excess intangible drilling costs. 249 The taxpayer had executed var-
ious consents to extend the statute of limitations applicable to his 1982
return, to December 31, 1987. This extended the period in which he
could claim a refund based on his 1982 return to June 30, 1988.250 The
IRS disallowed the 1989 refund claim on the basis that it was not timely.
25 1
The taxpayer brought suit for refund in the district court. The district
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
25 2
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court's
decision was affirmed.2 53 The appellate court noted that a refund suit
may not be brought until a timely refund claim has first been filed with the
IRS.2 5 4 The refund claim must fully set forth the grounds upon which the
refund is said to be owed, and in any subsequent suit for refund, the tax-
payer may not rely upon any grounds not reasonably encompassed by
those set forth in the timely filed refund claim. 2 55 The taxpayer in Angle
argued that his original and 1986 refund claims put the IRS on notice,
generally, that the calculation of the correct amount of excess intangible
drilling costs was at issue. The taxpayer argued that his 1989 refund claim
merely posited a new method for its recalculation and did not advance a
244. 996 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1993).
245. Id. at 253; see I.R.C. § 57(a)(2)(11) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
246. Angle, 996 F.2d at 253.
247. Id.
248. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(1),(8) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
249. Angle, 996 F.2d at 253.
250. Id. at 253 n.2; see I.R.C. § 6511(c)(1) (1988).
251. Angle, 996 F.2d at 253.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 256.
254. Id. at 253. I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1988) provides:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or col-
lected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the [IRS],
according to ... the regulations of the Secretary [of the Treasury] established in
pursuance thereof.
255. See Herrington v. United States, 416 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1969). The applica-
ble Treasury Regulation provides:
No refund or credit will be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of
limitation applicable to the filing of a claim therefor except upon one or more of
the grounds set forth in a claim filed before the expiration of such period. The
claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed
and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977).
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new theory of recovery. 256 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument,
noting that the 1989 claim "involve[d] theories different from any that tax-
payer put forward in the timely filed claims."2 57 Thus, the claim was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
2 58
The importance of properly formalizing tax arrangements was high-
lighted in White v. Commissioner.2 5 9 The taxpayers in White had caused a
family partnership to be formed in Utah and funded it with personal and
business assets of the family.260 The family also purported to transfer a
tract of undeveloped land to the partnership. Other than the execution of
an unrecorded and undelivered deed which did not contain a description
of the property, however, no action was taken to transfer the tract to the
partnership, and it remained titled in the names of individual family mem-
bers. 26 1 In 1982, construction of a house began on the tract. The partner-
ship's cash flow provided the bulk of the funds needed for construction,
which extended over several years. When financing was necessary from
time to time, the family members-not the partnership-borrowed the
funds individually and executed deeds of trust to the lender in their indi-
vidual capacities, giving the lender a security interest in the tract.2 62 The
IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency, asserting that the moneys applied by the
partnership toward construction of the house constituted deemed cash
distributions from the partnership to the partners; and to the extent the
deemed distributions were in excess of the partners' bases in their respec-
tive partnership interests, were taxable as capital gains.
263
The Tax Court sided with the IRS, 26 4 and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.265 The taxpayers correctly pointed out that under Utah
law, property acquired with partnership funds is presumed to be partner-
ship property;2 66 and that partnership property can be held in the name
of a general partner.2 67 The Court of Appeals determined, however, that
in fact the partnership simply failed to acquire any property.268 The part-
ners had owned the property in their individual capacities prior to the
formation of the partnership, and therefore could not be viewed as having
held the property on behalf of a yet-unformed partnership. 269 The subse-
quent improvement to the tract, in the form of the house, merely became
part of the realty. As such, the home was simply an enhancement to the
property interest held by the partners, not a separate property interest
256. Angle, 996 F.2d at 254.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 255.
259. 991 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1993).
260. Id. at 659.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 660; see I.R.C. § 731 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
264. White v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181 (1991).
265. White, 991 F.2d at 662.
266. Id. at 660; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-5 (1994).
267. White, 991 F.2d at 660; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-7 (1994).




held by the partnership. 270 The partnership therefore did not acquire any
property interest with partnership funds; it merely improved property held
individually by the partners. Moreover, the evidence-such as the manner
in which financing was obtained and the fact that the deeds of trust were
delivered in the individual names of the partners-reflected that the part-
ners treated the tract as owned by them in their individual capacities and
not by the partnership.2 71 Thus, any amounts expended by the partner-
ship to improve the partners' property constituted deemed cash distribu-
tions to the partners.
272
In Buckmaster v. United States,27 3 the personal representative of the de-
ceased taxpayer's estate had distributed the estate's income in equal
shares to its beneficiaries in each of the two taxable years the estate was
open.2 74 The estate then claimed deductions on the estate's income tax
returns for these distributions under the provision of the Internal Reve-
nue Code that allows a deduction for income either required to be cur-
rently distributed by the estate-such as by the express terms of the will-
or which is otherwise "properly paid" during the tax year to the benefi-
ciaries of the estate. 275 The decedent's will did not require these distribu-
tions to be made. The IRS challenged the deductions on the grounds the
distributions were not "properly paid" by the estate because in neither year
did the personal representative secure an order from the probate court
authorizing the distributions before they were made.2 76 When the estate
was closed in February 1986, however, the state probate court in
Oklahoma had issued an order of final settlement in which it approved all
actions taken by the personal representative. 277 The order was a general
one and did not reference specifically the distributions, though they were
set out in the final accounting filed with the petition for final settle-
ment.2 78 The estate paid the deficiency and filed a refund action in dis-
trict court, which granted the government's motion for summary
judgment.
279
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, siding with
the estate. 280 The court of appeals noted that a post-distribution approval
will render the distribution "properly paid" only if the approval is recog-
nized as valid under the state law governing the estate's administration.
28 1
Finding no reported decision of the Oklahoma courts on point, the court
reviewed decisions emanating from states other than Oklahoma and con-
cluded that "every appellate court that has directly considered the ques-
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 661.
273. 984 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1993).
274. Id. at 380.
275. Id.; see I.R.C. § 661(a) (2) (1988).




280. Id. at 383.
281. Buckmaster, 984 F.2d at 381.
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tion, including the United States Supreme Court," has treated post-
distribution approvals as valid. 282 The court of appeals concluded that
"the Oklahoma Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would con-
sider distributions of estate income by an executor or administrator made
without prior probate court approval but subsequently ratified by that
court to be 'properly paid' " within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code.
2 83
The taxpayer in Worden v. Commissione28 4 was an insurance agent.
The taxpayer primarily sold casualty and property insurance, but occasion-
ally sold life insurance through Federal Home Life Insurance Com-
pany.2 85 Apparently as a "loss leader" to maintain goodwill with his
clients, and in accordance with written contracts entered into with his cli-
ents, the taxpayer sold the life insurance policies "at cost"; that is, the first
year premium collected from his clients was equal only to the net amount
the taxpayer was obligated to remit to Federal Home Life. 286 Normally,
the taxpayer would have been entitled to collect a larger amount from the
insured: the net premium payable to the insurer and a commission he
would retain for himself.2 87 Instead, the taxpayer collected only the net
first year premium due to Federal Home Life, which was remitted in full to
the insurer. He never collected or paid himself a commission. On the
assumption that the taxpayer was in fact paying himself a commission, Fed-
eral Home Life filed an informational return indicating that the taxpayer
had earned approximately $33,000 in commissions from the sale of its life
insurance. 288 The IRS assessed this amount to the taxpayer on the theory
the taxpayer had "constructively received" the commissions 289 even
though he had never actually received them. 290 The Tax Court upheld the
assessment.
29 1
The taxpayer appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed.2 92 The court noted that the taxpayer's contract with Federal
Home Life obligated the taxpayer to remit only the net premium, so there
was no question of the arrangement constituting a deemed payment of the
larger amount to the insurer with a deemed payment back of the commis-
282. Id. at 383.
283. Id.
284. 2 F.3d 359 (10th Cir. 1993).
285. Id. at 360.
286. Id. at 360-61.
287. Id. at 361.
288. See id. at 360-61.
289. Cash basis taxpayers must report items of income in the year they are "actually or
constructively received." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (a) (as amended in 1978). A taxpayer is
deemed to be in constructive receipt of an item of income "in the taxable year during which
it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may
draw upon it an any time." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
290. Worden, 2 F.3d at 361. The IRS also determined the waived commissions could not
be deducted by the taxpayer because the arrangements constituted illegal kickbacks to the
clients, and were therefore nondeductible under I.R.C. § 162(c) (2) (1988). The Tax Court
agreed. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach this question, having reversed
the Tax Court on the question of constructive receipt. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 362.
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sion. 293 Federal Home Life never paid any commission to the taxpayer,
nor was it obligated to do so.29 4 Likewise, the taxpayer's written contract
with each client specified that the client was only obligated to pay the net
premium, not some higher amount that included a commission. 295 Thus,
the taxpayer was not providing a reduction of premium or a kickback, but
was merely waiving his right to the commission prior to his having earned
it. Under these facts, the court of appeals held that the taxpayer could not
be viewed as having constructively received the commissions and reversed
the determination of the Tax Court.
29 6
B. Enforcement
The taxpayers in Anaya v. Commissioner,2 9 7 a married couple, were
partners in a partnership that kept inadequate financial and tax records
from which it was not possible to determine or verify their taxable in-
comes. The evidence indicated the taxpayers maintained a lavish lifestyle
inconsistent with their claim that their joint income never exceeded
$15,000 in any of the three tax years in question.2 9 8 A criminal investiga-
tion did not yield an indictment, but a civil case against the taxpayers
culminated in the IRS issuing a Notice of Deficiency asserting underre-
ported income in excess of $70,000 and proposing a deficiency plus a civil
fraud penalty equal to fifty percent of the deficiency. 2 99 The taxpayers
filed a petition with the Tax Court, which upheld the IRS's
determination.
3 00
To reconstruct the taxpayers' taxable income and generate the Notice
of Deficiency, the IRS used the "cash expenditure method."30 1 Under this
method, the IRS is entitled to rely on the magnitude of funds expended
from a taxpayers' checking account in determining taxable income, so
long as the IRS can present evidence either that the funds were likely de-
rived from taxable sources, or in fact were derived from taxable sources (in
the latter case, by tracking deposits made to the account). 30 2 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the taxpayers had produced no
credible evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness in the IRS's
293. See id.
294. Id.
295. Worden, 2 F.3d at 362.
296. Id.
297. 983 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1993).
298. Id. at 187. Among other indications of unreported income, the taxpayers' mortgage
payments exceeded their claimed monthly income by more than $200. In addition, the tax-
payers took numerous vacations, owned a "Corvette with personalized plates," a satellite dish,
solar energy equipment, and a large swimming pool. Id.
299. Id. at 187-88; see I.R.C. § 6653(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). The fifty percent civil fraud
penalty was repealed by the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act, Sub-
title G of Title VII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10 1-239,
103 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The current penalty
scheme is set forth in I.R.C. §§ 6662-6664 (Supp. IV 1992). See Dennis R. Schmidt & Thomas
C. Pearson, Civil Penalty Provisions Revampted by IMPACT, 68 TAXEs 187 (1990); Richard C.
Stark, IMPACT Makes Fundamental Changes in Civil Penalties, 72J. TAX'N 132 (1990).
300. Anaya v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2040, 2041 (1991).
301. Anaya, 983 F.2d at 188.
302. Id.
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assessment30 3 and therefore affirmed the determination of the Tax




The issue in In Re Graham30 6 arose when the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Colorado imposed two awards of attorney's fees against the gov-
ernment in light of the "extraordinarily inept and confusing" manner in
which it had handled various aspects of the proceedings in the Bankruptcy
Court.3 0 7 The taxpayers had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1987. Following a "long history of procedural mis-
steps, neglect, and mismanagement" on the part of the government involv-
ing missed pleading deadlines, motions not properly served or filed,
hearings not attended, withheld documents, and files inadvertently de-
stroyed,3 0 8 the Bankruptcy Court assessed approximately $4,000 in attor-
ney's fees against the government.30 9 The government appealed, arguing
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented the imposition of attor-
ney's fees.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that absent "some explicit
statutory waiver that will support the bankruptcy court's award," 310 the fee
awards could not stand. The court then examined a series of statutory
provisions explicitly waiving sovereign immunity under various circum-
stances, but found each of them inapplicable.3 1' The court therefore re-
versed the attorney's fee awards.
3 12
The issue in In Re Richards3 13 involved the application of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provision that affords seventh priority status to tax claims as-
sessed within 240 days before the filing of a bankruptcy petition.3 1 4 The
debtor had filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
303. The assessment proposed in the Notice of Deficiency is presumed correct, and the
taxpayer bears the burden of proof in showing the assessment to be incorrect. Jones v. Com-
missioner, 903 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1990).
304. Anaya, 983 F.2d at 188.
305. Id. at 189
306. 981 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1992).
307. Id. at 1137.
308. Id.
309. In re Graham, 106 B.R. 692, 693 (D. Colo. 1989).
310. In re Graham, 981 F.2d at 1139.
311, Id. The court analyzed I.R.C. § 7430(c) (4) (1988), the general provision of the In-
ternal Revenue Code for the award of litigation costs. Id. The court held that section 7430
did not apply, as sanctions can be imposed against government only if its litigation position
was substantially unjustified, and no "position" of the government was implicated here, only
administrative incompetence. Id. The court also looked at 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (Bank-
ruptcy Court's power to sanction a party for contempt does not include an express waiver of
sovereign immunity that would authorize a monetary sanction), FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (Bank-
ruptcy Court rules determined to be distinguishable), and 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (provisions
that waive sovereign immunity in three categories of cases found inapplicable). Id. at 1140-
41.
312. Id at 1140.
313. 994 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1993).
314. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (7) (A) (1988).
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ruptcy Code ninety-six days after the IRS had entered an assessment
against him for certain long overdue taxes.3 15 The IRS filed a proof of
claim listing the claim as seventh priority. 16 As such, the claim was re-
quired to be paid in full. There was no objection to the IRS's proof of
claim, however, 219 days after filing the petition, the debtor voluntarily
dismissed the petition.3 17 Subsequently, fifty-one days after dismissing his
petition and 365 days after the assessment, the debtor filed a second Chap-
ter 13 petition.3 18 The IRS again filed a proof of claim listing its claim as
seventh priority, to which the debtor objected. The Bankruptcy Court
held that the 240-day period was suspended during the pendency of the
first bankruptcy petition, such that the total time elapsed between the as-
sessment and the filing of the second petition was reduced to 147 days,
well within the 240 days provided in the statute.3 19 The district court
affirmed.
3 20
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Bank-
ruptcy Code contains no explicit authority for the tolling the 240-day pe-
riod in the case of successive petitions in bankruptcy.3 21 The court of
appeals nevertheless affirmed the order of the Bankruptcy Court, holding
that the Bankruptcy Court's determination to toll the 240-day period was
within the power granted it under the Bankruptcy Code to " 'issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions' of the Bankruptcy Code and to take 'any action or mak[e]
any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement
court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.' ",322 According to
the court of appeals, an order suspending the 240-day period in this fash-
ion "fulfills and preserves Congress's intent to afford the government cer-
tain time periods to pursue collection efforts, and at the same time
prevents the debtor from avoiding priority by prolonging the initial bank-
ruptcy proceeding."
3 23
D. Annual Round-up of Tax Protestors
The annual Tenth Circuit case involving the National Commodity
and Barter Association (NCBA) and its "service wing,"32 4 the National
Commodity Exchange (NCE), is Aspinall v. United States.32 5 The plaintiffs
in Aspinall were account holders of the NCE and members of the NCBA.
The NCBA has been consistently characterized by the courts as a tax pro-




319. See id. at 752.
320. Richards, 141 B.R. at 752.
321. Richards, 994 F.2d at 765.
322. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988)).
323. Id.
324. See National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172, 1173 (10th
Cir. 1991).
325. 984 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
1994] 1095
DENVER UN!VERSITY LAW REVIEW
testor organization,32 6 and cases involving the NCBA, the NCE, and their
members are a frequent feature of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
calendar.3 2 7 In 1985, the United States executed a search warrant at the
NCBA/NCE offices and seized a large quantity of precious metals, coins,
and currency in furtherance of a jeopardy assessment made against the
organization for promoting abusive tax shelters.328 The seized commodi-
ties had been held by the NCE against the account balances of various
NCBA members. The NCE, in turn, paid the household and consumer
bills of the account holders, cashed checks for the account holders, and
otherwise acted to obscure the paper trail normally associated with taxpay-
ers' financial dealings, all in the name of the NCE. Having now seen these
commodities seized and their accounts rendered worthless, the plaintiffs
filed an action in the district court, claiming an interest in the seized prop-
erty and asserting that the seizure was improper.3 29
The plaintiffs' action was dismissed, and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 330 After rejecting a series of meritless proce-
dural objections relating to motions and hearings not granted to the plain-
tiffs, the court noted that the assets held by NCBA/NCE on behalf of each
account holder were commingled with those held on behalf of all other
account holders, much as a commercial bank commingles the funds of its
depositors. 33 1 Under Colorado law, when money is deposited in a bank
326. The National Commodity and Barter Association describes itself as an "organization
which espouses dissident views regarding the federal reserve and the IRS and advocates the
return to currency backed by gold and/or silver." United States v. National Commodity &
Barter Ass'n, 951 F.2d 1172, 1173 (10th Cir. 1991). The NCBA has been described as an
organization whose members "advocate dissident political views concerning the tax and mon-
etary policy of the United States Government," Kroll v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 982, 984
(N.D. Ind. 1983), in response to what the organization "perceives to be an unconstitutional
and oppressive monetary and taxation system. The leadership of the NCBA advocates and
promotes opposition to federal income taxation laws." United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d 446,
448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828 (1989). The National Commodity Exchange is "oper-
ated by NCBA members as a private or warehouse bank" the government views as a vehicle
designed, among other things, to obscure the paper trail surrounding the financial affairs of
its members. National Commodity &BarterAss'n, 951 F.2d at 1173. In essence, NCE acts as a
clearing house for a wide variety of financial transactions entered into by NCBA members by
carrying out those transactions on the members' behalf, but in the name of NCE. Each
NCBA member on whose behalf a particular transaction was effected would therefore remain
anonymous, insuring "a high degree of privacy for the member." Id. The only record of
these transactions maintained by NCE consisted of the current balance of each NCBA mem-
ber's account at NCE. Id.
327. See, e.g., Aspinall v. United States, 984 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 1993); Pleasant v. Lovell,
974 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Parsons, 976 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1992);
National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172 (10th Cir. 1991); Na-
tional Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989); Grandbouche v.
Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1989).
328. Aspinal4 984 F.2d at 356.
329. Id. The Internal Revenue Code provides:
If a levy has been made on property.., any person (other than the person against
whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or
lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring
a civil action against the United States. ...
I.R.C. § 7426(a) (1) (1988).
330. Aspinall 984 F.2d at 355.
331. Id. at 358.
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account, title to the money passes to the bank.33 2 The account holder
then becomes merely a creditor of the bank, and the account represents a
chose in action against the bank in the depositor's favor. 333 Such a credi-
tor relationship represents a " 'mere claim of a contractual right to be
paid, unsecured by a lien or other specifically enforceable property inter-
est' " and is insufficient to confer standing under I.R.C. § 7426.
3 3
4
The taxpayer in United States v. Meek335 was a member of the Freeman
Education Association (FEA), a tax protest organization similar in purpose
and operation to the NCBA.33 6 The taxpayer received substantial income
from a trust that owned a majority interest in a Coca-Cola bottling plant.
Acting on the beliefs that led him to membership in the FEA, the taxpayer
did not file federal income tax returns for any year subsequent to 1976. In
1987, the taxpayer was convicted of willfully failing to file federal income
tax returns for 1981, 1982, and 1983.337 The taxpayer was sentenced to
three years in prison. Tenaciously clinging to his beliefs, the taxpayer
while in prison failed to file tax returns for 1987 and 1988, despite contin-
uing to receive income from the trust.338 As a result, the taxpayer was
again tried and convicted for willfully failing to file tax returns as well as
willfully attempting to evade income taxes33 9 for the tax years 1987 and
1988. On appeal of this conviction, the taxpayer argued that the jury in-
structions were erroneous.
3 40
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the con-
viction.3 4 1 The court of appeals also affirmed the manner in which the
district court applied federal sentencing guidelines in determining the
length of the taxpayer's new prison term.
34 2
332. Id.
333. Id (citing Jefferson Bank & Trust v. United States, 894 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (10th Cir.
1990)).
334. Aspinall 984 F.2d at 358 (quoting Valley Fin., Inc., v. United States, 629 F.2d 162,
168 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
335. 998 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1993).
336. The FEA is an organization,
designed to provide its members with an alternative to the Federal Reserve System.
The FEA acts essentially as a warehouse bank, retaining funds deposited by its mem-
bers until directed to disburse these funds. At the time the defendant became a
member of the FEA, all transactions were conducted by means of a numbering sys-
tem to protect the privacy of FEA members. At trial, a former trustee of the FEA
testified that the majority of FEA members were individuals who believed that the
income tax laws were either unconstitutional or voluntary and wanted to avoid leav-
ing a paper trail for the IRS.
Meek, 998 F.2d at 778.
337. Id; see I.R.C. § 7203 (Supp. IV 1992).
338. While in prison, the taxpayer was paid $126,266.00 in 1987 and $92,565.10 in 1988.
Meek, 998 F.2d at 778.
339. Id; see I.R.C. § 7201 (1988).
340. Meek, 998 F.2d at 779.
341. Id The taxpayer argued that the jury instructions did not apprise the jury of the
need to find that the defendant must have committed an affirmative act constituting an eva-
sion of taxes. The court of appeals held that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, did in
fact put the jury on notice of the need to make such a determination. Id
342. In determining the length of the taxpayer's sentence, the district court considered
the taxpayer's unreported income for all the years 1984 through 1991, not just the two years
to which the current conviction related. The court of appeals found this to be proper. Id. at
782.
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